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ABSTRACT 
Traditional warfare has taken on a new meaning in the wake of the September 11 
terrorist attacks. Winning peace has become just as important as winning the war. In the 
military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that followed the terrorist attacks, it has 
become increasingly clear that winning peace is a complicated process. In this regard, the 
concept of stabilization and reconstruction is no simple task and requires planning in 
advance of combat operations. Unfortunately, current measures of effectiveness are either 
too narrowly constructed or far too complex for application in the hostile environment 
that accompanies stabilization and reconstruction. This thesis examines the concept of 
stabilization and reconstruction and exposes the weaknesses and strengths of measures of 
effectiveness (MOE). The underlying goal is to formulate a simplified and effective MOE 
for the successful post-combat stabilization and reconstruction efforts. It is the author’s 
position that the success of stabilization and reconstruction depends in large part on the 
ability to monitor progress and to respond to obstacles that arise in the course of 
stabilization and reconstruction. 
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I. CHAPTER I  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate the seamless connection 
between the conflict and the post-conflict stages of warfare. While the United States 
defeated both the Iraqi army and Taliban insurgents quickly, years later both countries 
remain challenged by “spoilers.” For example, according to The Millennium Challenge 
Corp., an agency President George W. Bush established in 2004 to distribute aid, both 
countries failed in 2007 in six areas of post-conflict operations: rule of law, civil liberties, 
corruption control, accountability, security and government effectiveness.1 Prior 
planning, a focus on long-term goals, and civil-military cooperation throughout all stages 
of field operations can increase the probability of success in post-conflict state-building 
enterprises.2 U.S. government agencies tend to compile metrics on measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs) without the benefit of comparative models.3 In the end, variables 
with diverse values are accumulated with the emphasis on incident evaluation, such as 
deaths and other casualties. However, important data on governance, economics, 
population perceptions and ideology might be overlooked.  
Colonel William Flavin (Ret.), Associate Professor of Peace Operations Concepts 
and Doctrine for the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, cautions that it “is always easier 
to get into a conflict than to get out of it,” 4 and notes the distinction between conflict 
termination and conflict resolution. The former denotes the “formal end of fighting, not 
the end of conflict,” while “conflict resolution” relates to resolving the causes of the 
 
1 B. Murray, “Iraq, Afghanistan Fail in U.S.–Compiled Democracy Rankings,” (October 16, 2008), 
Bloomberg.com, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=abLODyD2Yo4E (accessed 
July 30, 2009).  
2 P. Hughes, “Planning for Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Learning From Iraq,” National Defense 
University Institute for National Strategic Studies (July 29, 2004). 
3 A. Cordesman and A. Burke, “Analyzing the Afghan-Pakistan War,” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (July 2008): 3. 
4 W. Flavin, “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,” Parameters (Autumn 
2003): 95–112, 95. 
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conflict.5 Conflict resolution requires a coherent strategy of stabilization and 
reconstruction to mitigate those factors that created the instability and violence while 
building local and state capacity to sustain peace.6 
Successfully executing Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) 
operations requires the commander to develop MOEs that assess “the progress in 
achieving the goals set forth in the” SSTR objectives for the conflict’s operations.7 For 
example, the use of force to quell an insurgency may provide an improved security 
environment in the short term, but also foster sectarian distrust and thus hinder the 
transition to a long-term representative government. The difficulty arises in the attempt to 
measure the level of sectarian distrust in a society. One can easily quantify the number of 
insurgent attacks and correlate that measure (presumably a negative correlation) to an 
increase in security patrols. However, does a decline in insurgent attacks necessarily 
indicate an upswing in sectarian trust?  
Current and previous MOE theories are unsatisfactory in that they typically rely 
on analyses that pay scant attention to those factors that produce instability and conflict in 
the first place. Additionally, MOEs utilized by the military tend to measure ongoing 
progress by reference to “a fundamental systemic problem through a systematic 
approach.”8 In other words, military MOEs typically rely on past models of 
assessment—body counts, territory taken—rather than MOEs tailored to the uniqueness 
of a specific conflict. Reliance on previous, “military centric” MOEs in today’s SSTR 
operations threatens to distort strategic choices and ultimately disillusion public opinion 
at home, not to mention in the warzone. Recognizing the flaws in the military centric 
MOEs, a newer assessment tool for Iraq was developed by the Brookings Institute The 
Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, a 
 
5 Flavin, “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,” 95–112, 95. 
6 Craig Cohen, “Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction,” United States Institute of 
Peace: Stabilization and Reconstruction Series (2003): 1–12, 1. 
7 C. Schauppner, “Measuring the Immeasurable: Applying Hierarchical Holographic Modeling to 
Developing Measures of Effectiveness for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations,” 
A Paper Submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in Partial Satisfaction of the Requirement of 
the Department of Joint Military Operations, (May 16, 2006): 1–43, 1. 
8 Ibid., 2. 
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omy, and quality of life.10  
                                                
set of MOEs that largely focuses on the security pillar of reconstruction.9 Similarly, the 
Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-911 
Afghanistan, also developed by the Brookings Institute relies heavily on measuring 
security indicators. But at least the Afghanistan Index puts greater emphasis on other 
indicators such as advances in governance, rule of law, econ
Other organizations have developed SSTR MOEs of their own: The RAND 
Corporation has developed “sector-specific” security indicators,11 Freedom House and 
Transparency International focus on developed governance indicators,12 while the World 
Bank targets rule of law.13 The Collaborative for Development Action has devised MOEs 
for peace building.14 The American Bar Association’s Central European and Eurasian 
Law Initiative (ABA CEELI) tracks discrimination against women.15 The United States 
Institute of Peace (USIP), the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and the 
United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) 
collaborated to produce Measuring Progress in Conflict Environment (MPICE) which 
measures longer term trends in governance, economics, security, rule of law and social 
well-being.16 
While each of these systems demonstrate a more satisfactory approach to 
measuring progress in the post-conflict environment, there is room for improvement. 
 
9 M. O’Hanlon and J. Campbell, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in 
Post-Saddam Iraq,” Brookings Institute (June 4, 2009): 4–58. 
10 Campbell and Shapiro, “Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in 
Post-9/11 Afghanistan,” 4–49. 
11 Craig Cohen, “Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction,” United States Institute of 
Peace: Stabilization and Reconstruction Series (2003): 1–12. 
12 L. Diamond and M. Plattner, Democracy after Communism (John Hopkins University Press, 2002), 
157. 
13 M. Treblicock and R. Daniels, Rule of Law Reform and Development: Charting the Fragile Path of 
Progress (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008), 42. 
14 Development Studies Network, “Organisations,” Development Bulletin (2000): 53, 114–118, 114. 
15 T. Landman, “Map-Making and Analysis of the Main International Initiatives on Developing 
Indicators on Democracy and Good Governance,” University of Essex–Human Rights Centre, Eurostat 
Contract No. 20022120005, Final Report (July 14, 2003): 1–95. 
16 United States Institute of Peace, “Metrics Framework for Assessing Conflict Transformation and 
Stabilization,” United States Institute of Peace (February 2008), www.usip.org/peaceops/mpice.pdf 
(accessed January 3, 2009).  
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Aside from MPICE, these MOEs are too narrowly focused and fail to collect sufficient 
information from each of the four pillars of reconstruction. MPICE takes a more 
comprehensive approach to each of the factors that contribute to creating and dissolving 
conflict and provides a good basis for the development of more satisfactory MOEs. 
However, the overly complex nature of MPICE’s massive data collection and analysis 
requirements makes it difficult for commanders to decipher trends, let alone adjust their 
strategy to take account of them. The optimum solution would be to combine the 
academic and statistical rigor of MPICE with a field-friendly method to assess progress. 
Each of these MOE systems has been developed specifically to guide analysts and 
planners in their strategic choices to achieve the desired outcomes in post-conflict 
environments. However, neither conflict nor SSTR operations are linear enterprises. 
Rather, they are subject to the tensions and unpredictable nature of conflict, in which 
operational demands may pre-empt longer-term strategic priorities. Ultimately, MOEs are 
only useful so far as they take account of the operational demands/requirements while not 
compromising the strategic focus. A successful MOE should factor in progress in a fluid 
environment. In the opinion of this author, current MOEs are useful, at best, for long-
term planning, but inadequate for adjusting to operational demands that inevitably arise.  
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
At present, the U.S. government lacks the capacity and the tools to monitor and 
measure military progress before, during, and after field operations, because it lacks 
adequate MOEs for measuring both long and short-term social, economic, and political 
progress within the ambit of an SSTR environment. In 2003, then Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld admitted to his top generals: “We lack the metrics to know if we are 
winning or losing.”17  
The current MOEs provide tools that are best suited to measuring outputs and 
inputs as opposed to outcome (effects). As a result, they fail to elicit thoughtful responses 
to a changing environment with an eye on the long-term consequences. They are either 
 
17 Donald Rumsfeld, “Rumsfeld Memo,” USA Today (October 13, 2003), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm (accessed January 2, 2009). 
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too narrowly focused on the collection and analysis requirements, or far too complex for 
effective application in a hostile environment. Although current MOEs provide an 
operational framework for application to stabilization and reconstruction in the post-
conflict environment, a far more comprehensive set of MOEs suitable for application 
before, during, and following the actual conflict is required. Intelligence and progress 
before and during the conflict will inevitably influence operations in the post-conflict 
environment. The purpose of this thesis is, therefore, to identify the current MOEs, assess 
their weaknesses and strengths, and formulate a comprehensive set of MOEs for 
satisfactory application to SSTR. 
The author takes the position that where MOEs exist, they are typically ad-hoc 
and focus almost entirely on inputs, with an emphasis on quantitative indicators of 
limited utility. They tend to discount the quality, rationale, and appropriateness of the 
initial inputs and fail to factor in the evaluation of external conditions. Ultimately, the 
connection between performance indicators and underlying goals is lacking. Similarly, 
minimal attention is paid to benchmarks, which are essential for monitoring progress. In 
other words, the current MOEs place far too much emphasis on outputs and inputs, and 
very little, if any, on outcomes. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION  
As previously noted, current MOEs are flawed in that they either focus too 
narrowly on one aspect or are too complex to usefully measure progress in a dynamic 
environment. In order to substantiate this claim, this thesis will examine both the current 
MOEs and the conflict environment to which they apply to determine their strengths and 
weaknesses. The largest (current) models of MOEs developed by the Brookings Institute, 
RAND, and MPICE are particularly relevant as they were designed for the conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as integrate MOEs used in past conflicts.  
This thesis will examine how MOEs should be utilized to form a more 
comprehensive assessment tool by taking into account the differences in the political and 
cultural environment of states in which SSTR is applied. By exposing inadequacies, it is  
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possible to redesign a more comprehensive set of MOEs. Moreover, by taking the 
strengths of each of these MOEs and eliminating their weaknesses, a more suitable 
system can be devised. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The current conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq have changed the concept of 
conflict resolution in the 21st century.18 Both conflicts have shown that without 
satisfactory MOEs, strategies are muddled and conflict may be prolonged. For instance, 
in 2005, Lieutenant General David Petraeus reported that the United States had 
successfully trained at least 24 Iraqi battalions (approximately 24,000 troops) to operate 
independently. An additional 40 Iraqi battalions were deemed able to manage counter-
insurgencies with U.S. or other coalition assistance. Unfortunately, Petraeus’ report 
proved to be wildly inaccurate because only one Iraqi battalion proved capable of 
operating without outside assistance. Obviously, inaccurate assessments are worse than 
meaningless–they can also be dangerous. Although progress reports indicate that 211,026 
Iraqi security forces had been trained by November 2005,19 no attempt was made to 
calculate operational effectiveness. In the final analysis, Petraeus’ report focused entirely 
on the output of “trained” soldiers rather than “input” of “operationally capable” 
maneuver units. By the first standard, one might argue that great progress had been 
achieved; by the second, the goal of sustainable security remained elusive. 
A poll conducted in October 2007 by the Center for American Progress revealed 
that 80 percent of the Iraqi’s “strongly oppose” having foreign military in Iraq. Worse, 
another 57 percent believed it is perfectly permissible to attack coalition forces in Iraq.20 
This poll indicates that after six years of occupation, SSTR strategies had still failed to 
win over a majority of the Iraqi population. In the absence of MOEs that take into 
 
18 R. Litwak, “The Imperial Republic after 9/11,” Wilson Quarterly (Summer 2002): 76–82, 77–78. 
19 “Huge Progress,” Made in Training Iraq Troops: U.S. General, Washington AP (November 7, 
2005), 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Huge_Progress_Made_In_Training_Iraq_Troops__U.S._General.html 
(accessed July 22, 2009). 
20 L. Korb and C. Wadhams, “Afghanistan is Not Iraq,” Center for American Progress (February. 19, 
2008), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/02/afghanistan_iraq.html (assessed July 29, 2009). 
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account the attitudes and desires of the population, and measure other aspects of the 
environment as the basis of a realistic net assessment, progress in SSTR will remain 
guesswork. Our experience in Afghanistan and Iraq suggests that current MOEs are 
insufficiently comprehensive. For example, in 2007 and 2008, MOEs used in Iraq 
primarily included measuring the numbers of trained security forces, the quantity of 
electricity supplied to Iraqi homes, U.S. casualties, and other measurements of interest to 
the U.S. public.21 While U.S. public opinion is important, measuring all aspects of the 
environment, including the local population’s perspective and attitudes, is equally if not 
more vital to success. 
The ability to satisfactorily measure and follow progress helps organizations 
prioritize efforts and resources in each phase.22 For instance, the United States and its 
coalition partners have had to adjust to an evolving and increasingly hostile environment 
in Afghanistan. In 2001, the Afghan invasion was directed against al Qaeda and the 
Taliban. The goal was to create a friendly central government. However, since 2008, the 
United States has been engaged in a “multifaceted counterinsurgency effort.”23 Strategies 
and priorities had to be changed in the middle of the conflict, which required an 
unanticipated reassignment of personnel and resources.24 Had adequate MOEs been in 
place in Afghanistan, perhaps the various government, military, and civilian agencies 
might have been able to track the deteriorating security situation and react accordingly. 
Additionally, in post-conflict environments, global standards of progress and success 
ensure accountability and transparency, both important in building support for SSTR 
operatives among allies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the international 
community. For instance, MOEs that focus exclusively or primarily on casualties do not 
 
21 G. Lubold, “In Afghanistan, Time is Running Out, Pentagon Worries,” The Christian Science 
Monitor (June 2, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0603/p02s01-usmi.html (accessed July 29, 2009). 
22 National Performance Review, “Serving the American Public: Best Practices in Performance 
Measurement,” University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents (June 1997), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/papers/benchmrk/nprbook.html (accessed January 3, 2009). 
23 U.S. Accountability Office, “Afghanistan and Iraq: Availability of Forces, Equipment, and 
Infrastructure should be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and Plans,” Statement of Janet St. 
Laurent, Managing Director Defense Capabilities and Management (February 12, 2009): 1. 
24 Ibid. 
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encourage support of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.25 While satisfactory MOEs 
have the capacity to expose mistakes and help to avoid them in future, too much focus on 
casualties and not enough on progress in other areas can discourage those who might 
otherwise assist in the effort. 
An organization that can accurately assess its strengths and weaknesses is in a 
better position to make timely adjustments, thereby avoiding the complications that 
necessarily follow from inflexible and rigid strategies. When organizations implement 
benchmarks and baseline definitions for success, a systematic method of measurement 
will permit them to know if they are successful. This allows them to credibly request 
stakeholders’ resources as well as support from political constituencies. The post-conflict 
operations in Japan and Germany following the Second World War offer an example of 
how obtaining international cooperation can lead to successful reconstruction.26  
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the evolution of meaningful MOEs 
significantly increase the probability of the success of SSTR missions. The theory and 
past application of MOEs will serve as a starting point. This thesis will begin with an 
exploration of the metrics deployed in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.27 Both operations provide a basis for analyzing the desirable framework for 
stability operations and establishing a framework for assessing the effectiveness of 
MOEs. As this research is more concerned with qualitative than quantitative analysis, the 
two chosen case studies provide a sufficient basis for evaluation.  
 
25 Bill Roggio, “U.S. Military Ends Enemy Bodycounts in Afghanistan,” The Weekly Standard (July 
24, 2009), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2009/07/us_military_ends_enemy_bodycou.asp 
(accessed July 29, 2009). 
26 D. Quayat, “Policy Options for Post-Conflict Operations in Iraq,” The John Hopkins University 
School of Advanced International Studies (December 13, 2002): 1–8, 3. 
27 The author limits the point of reference to two operations because two examples can be successfully 
used to validate a hypothesis. Moreover, by limiting the research to two current MOE approaches in 
modern conflict resolution, it is easier to evaluate complicated details effectively. By focusing on two 
operations, a more detailed evaluation is possible. Focusing on a number of operations will limit the 
attention given to specific events. 
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F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter I defines the problem, the main research question, and sub-questions for 
investigation. It also explains the significance of this research and the methodology, 
design, and organization of the study.  
Chapter II examines the theory, history, and doctrine of stabilization and 
reconstruction operations. It highlights the importance of SSTR and defines how 
satisfactory MOEs can dictate the success of these operations. The Brookings Institute 
framework provides a basis for understanding the intent of MOEs as well as a device for 
understanding what MOEs should accomplish in the post-conflict environment.  
Chapter III will suggest a more reliable set of MOEs and apply them to the 
selected OEF and OIF case studies via the MPICE and RAND frameworks to expose 
current MOE weaknesses as hands-on tools for commanders. It will then offer a more 
commander-friendly MOE operational design. 
 10
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II. CHAPTER II 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of current measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs) in post-conflict environments is only possible after a thorough examination of 
the aims and objectives of post-conflict operations, which are essentially to end or 
contain conflict through the successful completion of stabilization and reconstruction. 
This chapter will explore the doctrinal basis of SSTR with reference to its history and 
development. This author argues that interagency coordination is key because MOEs 
must measure progress across a range of areas covered by various agencies, as well as the 
military. 
This chapter will first define the scope and content of SSTR before giving a brief 
overview of its history since World War II. OEF and OIF are offered as cases in which 
MOEs too narrowly conceived to assess progress were applied. Finally, the end of this 
chapter will evaluate current MOEs in general and how they are used in stabilization and 
reconstruction operations. Specific MOEs better adapted to current SSTR environments 
will be discussed in the third chapter.  
B. DEFINING STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
Behsahel, Oliker and Peterson argue that SSTR encapsulates a wide range of 
overlapping missions, each of which involves a broad range of approaches.28 SSTR 





28 N. Bensahel, O. Oliker, and H. Peterson, Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Operations (RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009), 3. 
29 A. Rathmell, “Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?” International 
Affairs 81, no. 5 (2005): 1013–1038. 
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In this regard, stabilization and reconstruction can best understood as peace-building 
followed by peacekeeping missions.30 For instance, stabilization itself encompasses 
attempts to enforce peace, as well as terminate “social, economic, and political 
upheaval.”31 A more protracted view of stabilization involves a process which manages 
and reduces underlying tensions that could give way to violent resurgence.32 Stabilization 
efforts also manage and reduce the underlying problems that cause “break-down in law 
and order.”33 It is a pivotal part of the process following actual combat and can result in 
intentional or unintentional “additional conflict,” which requires counterinsurgency 
operations where progress is measured by metrics that assess the impact of operations on 
the local population. By definition, this means SSTR aims to control violence and unrest 
and promote peace by getting to the root of the underlying causes of violence and 
encourage key actors to compete in the political arena, not with arms.34  
Reconstruction works in tandem with stabilization. It involves social and 
economic rehabilitation and/or reconstruction immediately following combat 
operations.35 In the immediate aftermath of conflict, state governments are typically 
weakened. Moreover, war-related deaths, psychological stress, displacement, and damage 
 
30 D. Smith, “An Expanded Mandate for Peace Building: The State Department Role in Peace 
Diplomacy, Reconstruction, and Stabilization,” A Report of the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project 
(April 2009), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090423_smith_expandedmandate_web.pdf (accessed 
August 5, 2009). 
31 Bensahel, Oliker and Peterson, Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Operations, 3. 
32 United States Joint Forces Command, “U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for 
Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation,” J7 Pamphlet Version (2005): 1. 
33 Ibid. 
34 J. Schmidt, “Can Outsiders Bring Democracy to Post-Conflict States?” Orbis 52, no. 1 (2008): 107–
122. 
35 S. Anderline and J. El-Bushra, “Post Conflict Reconstruction,” (n.d.), 
http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/39_post_conflict.pdf (accessed August 5, 2009). 
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to infrastructure are impediments to a return to normality.36 If stabilization is 
unsuccessful, reconstruction will be delayed.37 The two work in tandem.38 
Put another way, stabilization endeavors to terminate violence while 
reconstruction seeks to eradicate those factors that will favor a reoccurrence of violence. 
Benbsahel, Oliker and Peterson maintain that: 
Although stabilization and reconstruction tasks are distinct, they affect 
each other in important ways. Once basic security has been established, 
reconstruction tasks are critical to eliminating many of the factors that can 
drive further violence.39 
In order for reconstruction operations to eliminate the factors that drive further violence, 
the nation building process must focus on reshaping the way in which citizens interact 
with the state, public services and the market. In other words, MOEs that measure citizen 
perceptions and outlooks will be more effective in measuring the success of 
reconstruction operations.  
Even so, stabilization efforts often form a necessary part of the reconstruction 
efforts as many of the pre-existing tensions that produced conflict in the first place are 
often increased by struggles over the spoils of war, including but not limited to struggles 
for power and/or resources.40 Both stabilization and reconstruction are directly related to 
national security. Regional conflict and under-development are simply two of several 
conditions that compromise national security because they spark “radicalism and spread 
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violence.”41 The underlying problems are far more profound than mere under-
development. If underdevelopment were the primary source of conflict, efforts by the 
World Trade Organization to assist least developing nations should have eradicated 
conflict many years ago. Perhaps it is more accurate to state that the political and social 
factors that contribute to underdevelopment also fuel conflict. Realizing that conflict has 
complex origins, stabilization and reconstruction require constant management and 
monitoring. 
C. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OVERVIEW 
The doctrinal basis of stabilization is predicated on the theory that winning the 
war means winning the peace.42 From the U.S. Army’s standpoint, this doctrinal 
approach is achieved by counterinsurgency, terrorism interception and deterrence, and 
peace missions, all of which contribute to security.43 The four pillars of reconstruction 
require restructuring governance, improving public safety, establishing the rule of law 
and initiating economic development.44 These missions seek to contain internal 
instability that abets conflict and create an environment that is both stable and that 
conforms to international standards or norms.45 In a typical case, the host countries of 
stabilization and reconstruction operations are dysfunctionally governed, if not in total 
chaos. This invariably requires that those executing stabilization and reconstruction 
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operations restore order, distribute humanitarian relief, and carry out a program of 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) for former combatants.46 
Historically, the antecedents of SSTR have evolved from the “conquest” of the 
Spanish Empire, to the imperialism or colonialism of the 19th and 20th century empires, 
the to “occupation” of Germany and Japan following the Second World War.47 Military 
stability operations in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans were referred to as peacekeeping 
or “peace enforcement” operations.48 Similar efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
currently identified as stabilization and reconstruction missions. The common thread that 
runs throughout each of these operations is that the military functioned as an instrument 
of the international community to transition conflict societies toward a stable peace.49 
Some salient differences emerge however, in the approaches taken to these post-
conflict military operations. For instance, the occupations of Germany and Japan, 
arguably two of the United States’ largest and most complex ventures into post-conflict 
occupation, were designed to bring about “rapid societal change.”50 At that point, 
according to a study conducted by the School of Advanced Military Studies, post-conflict 
military operations in the aftermath of the Second World War were regarded by the 
United States and the United Nations as precedent and standard setting for successful 
nation-building.51 As a result, the United States for the next 60 years emphasized combat 
operations on the assumption that victory paved the way for peace as “defeated” 
populations saw the errors of their ways and sought to rejoin the community of civilized 
nations.  
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The fallacy of this approach was showcased in Vietnam, where the United States 
focused on the destruction of the enemy’s military forces while largely shortchanging the 
SSTR dimensions of the conflict.52 This overly militarized focus invites body count 
metrics and overlooks or undervalues MOEs that measure progress in stabilization and 
reconstruction. Clearly, assessing the perceptions and desires of the Vietnamese people 
would have provided a better metric for assessing stabilization and reconstruction 
progress than counting the number of enemy insurgents or military personnel killed in 
combat operations. As John Robb, former Air Force officer and author of Brave New 
World explains, the days of third generation wars as witnessed in the WWII have long 
gone. Third generation warfare focuses on taking down the enemy by “deep penetration 
and disruption.”53 Measuring casualties would obviously correspond with these kinds of 
objectives but do not provide the kind of information necessary for measuring success in 
today’s fourth generation (or decentralized) warfare, particularly in post-combat 
stabilization and reconstruction operations.  
In 2007, General Peter Pace, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, stated the obvious 
that in Iraq measures of violence reduction mean nothing if the Iraqi people lack 
confidence in the competence or contest the legitimacy of their newly constituted 
government.54  
The rehabilitation of Germany and Japan succeeded for a number of contingent 
reasons. To begin with, the plan to stabilize Germany was driven by the recognition that 
it was the economic powerhouse of Europe, that needed to be demilitarized and 
denazified, and reintegrated into the political life of the continent. Moreover, this 
reflected the desire of the West German population and its post-war leaders, chastened, 
not to say shamed, by their Nazi past.55 Following Japan’s surrender, General Douglas 
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MacArthur was appointed as proconsul of Japan and took pains to preserve the integrity 
of the Japanese imperial family and to work his changes through the government. 
Furthermore, the Japanese are a homogeneous people who place a high premium on 
respect, and they cooperated fully with MacArthur’s forces by order of the emperor. 
This sort of receptive mentality was absent initially in Vietnam, a post-colonial 
state with a history of rebellion, strong nationalism, and an armed and active communist-
led insurgent movement determined to resist integration into a western economic or 
political framework. In 1968 General Creighton Abrams took over from General William 
Westmoreland as the commander of Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. 
Recognizing the previous focus on traditional military metrics of body counts and land 
acquired was not effective, General Abrams made significant changes. Under his 
authority, American forces were broken up into small units that would live with and train 
the South Vietnamese civilians to defend their villages from northern incursion. He also 
devoted vastly more time than his predecessor, General Westmoreland, to expanding, 
training, and equipping the ARVN. His strategy was surprisingly successful and as a 
result the South was able to confront the NVA's 1972 Easter Offensive, although U.S. 
troop strength under Abrams decreased from 535,000 in December 1968 to 140,000 in 
December 1971 to 30,000 combat troops at the end of 1972. Abrams’ focus on the 
population provided the right metrics to affect change, although the war was already 
politically and popularly unpalatable in the United States. 
D. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR 
ERA 
The post Cold War stabilization and reconstruction efforts have been less 
successful than those carried the post-World War II.56 For most of the Cold War, the 
U.S. military was primarily deployed to “preserve the status quo” and engage in crisis 
management rather than the resolution of underlying problems.57 Since the end of the  
 
 
56 Binnendijk and Johnson, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 12–13. 
57 Ibid., 12. 
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Cold War, the focus of MOEs remains the tracking of military progress rather than 
economic, social, and political outcomes in the stabilization and reconstruction 
operations.58  
As James Dobbins, former Assistant Secretary of State, explains, both the United 
Nations and the United States have, since the Cold War, engaged in post-conflict military 
operations designed to secure democratization.59 Ever since 1989, these nation-building 
missions have intensified in frequency, scope, range, and duration.60 During the Cold 
War, the U.S. engaged in military operations at least once in every ten years while the 
UN’s nation-building operations occurred at least once every four years. After 1989, the 
U.S. military operation missions increased to at least one each alternating year while the 
UN’s nation-building exercises increased to at least twice a year.61 For instance, the 
occupation of Somalia began as a humanitarian mission and developed into a state-
building effort.62 The occupation of Haiti established security that permitted the election 
of a president.63 This security in Haiti however, was short-lived and continues to be 
compromised by environmental problems and poverty, civil unrest, disenchantment with 
the government and wide-scale rioting.64 The occupation of Bosnia ended with the 
implementation of a multiethnic nation state that nevertheless remains fragile.65 Kosovo  
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also saw efforts to create a democracy and a market economy.66 However, by carving out 
the small state from Serbia, the United States destabilized the region and created a 
situation that led to ethnic cleansing. 
During the 1990s, the approach to stabilization and reconstruction depended on 
intense force for rapid resolution of instability.67 The U.S.-led interventions in Somalia, 
Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo were designed to discourage any thought of resistance.68 
However, in the Somalia operation, the “American force was drawn down too quickly” 
and the resulting casualties reinforced the United States’ determination to “establish and 
retain a substantial overmatch in any future” stabilization and reconstruction mission.69 It 
also encouraged the persistence of MOEs that focus on military progress 
The occupation of Afghanistan has been characterized by the removal of the 
Taliban in 2001 followed by a half-hearted attempt to create a democracy. The post-
conflict military operation in Iraq can be compared in scope to the transformational 
attempts in Bosnia and Kosovo and in scale to the occupations that took place in 
Germany and Japan.70 In each of these post-conflict military operations, the challenges 
were essentially the same. Each was characterized by widescale population displacement 
and similar damages to infrastructure. In each case, the United States was required to 
work closely with other partners. Unlike post-World War II, stability operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have been impeded by insurgency.71  
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The rapid occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq contrasts with the lack of 
preparedness to respond to the chaos that built in its aftermath.72 The gap between 
military success and a sputtering SSTR that followed has been a direct result of gaps in 
operational planning and strategies. The planning and intelligence that went into the 
invasion were neglected in Phase 4.73  
1. Operation Enduring Freedom 
Two months after initial combat operations began in Afghanistan, U.S.-led forces 
were successful in overthrowing the Taliban.74 By virtue of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1386, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established to 
aid in the formation of an Afghan Interim Authority.75 The ISAF’s primary goal of 
establishing security in and near Kabul was largely successful.76 As a result, 
Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai, UN delegates, and other officials enlisted the 
ISAF to extend its mandate to other parts of Afghanistan.  
U.S. military officials took a different approach, operating on the belief that 
“traditional peacekeeping” would be ineffective, unless backed up by “large numbers of 
troops to patrol Afghanistan’s remote cities and towns.”77 This belief was based on a 
2003 RAND study that claimed that in Bosnia and Kosovo some 18 to 20 peacekeepers 
were required per one thousand civilians.78 Therefore, borrowing from this example, 
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Afghanistan would require “hundreds of thousands of troops,” all the more so as Afghans 
had a history of being averse to intense “foreign presence.”79 
However, the idea of hundreds of thousands of troops was unpalatable to the 
pubic and beyond the capacities of U.S. forces, especially after the Bush administration 
decided to invade Iraq. Therefore, in 2003, the United States established the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to supplement the ISAF efforts.80 PRTs are comprised of 
between 60 and 100 or more military personnel and soon included Afghan advisors and 
delegates for civilian agencies such as the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Additionally, 
representatives from over 12 nations began participating in approximately 22 PRTs in 
Afghanistan for the purpose of providing security and reconstruction.81 PRTs have also 
participated in institutional transitions such as providing support for elections, building 
schools, disarmament and conflict resolution.82 
PRT successes depend on garnering support for the coalition in support of local 
governance.83 Although PRTs have enjoyed some success in Afghanistan, they have 
been hindered by a number of setbacks, one of the greatest being the lack of MOEs that 
collates all the information relative to progress. For example, Robert Perito from the U.S. 
Institute for Peace said that the MOEs employed by PRTs are no more than “anecdotal 
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impressions with the result that it is not possible to analyze what PRTs are 
accomplishing.84 As Michael McNerney, Director of International Policy and 
Capabilities in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability 
Operations, observes: 
Despite their potential and record of success, however, PRTs always have 
been in a bit of a muddle. Inconsistent mission statement, unclear roles 
and responsibilities, ad hoc preparation, and, most important, limited 
resources have confused potential partners and prevented PRTs from 
having a greater effect on Afghanistan’s future.85 
PRTs have had many hurdles to overcome. They were created in a hostile and 
constantly changing environment. And they were largely subject to lofty and unattainable 
standards.86 For instance, a November 2002 Coalition briefing described the PRTs 
mission in a variety of ways, including “to monitor, assist, coordinate bodies, facilitate, 
and aid cooperation.” 87 McNerney observes: 
The impression was that the PRTs were to be observing and facilitating 
everything being all things to all people but not actually accomplishing 
anything vital to the political or military missions.88 
From the onset, PRTs were also taxed by constraints on resources and tensions 
between the civilian and military personnel.89 The military personnel attached to PRTs 
utilized DoD’s Overseas Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) financial support to 
construct schools, repair health clinics, and dig wells and other forms of infrastructure 
management. However, the OHDACA had limited experience with these kinds of 
humanitarian endeavors and did not allow the PRTs the “flexibility to implement projects 
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like repairing major infrastructure, building police stations or prisons, and training or 
equipping security forces.”90 In other words, PRTs had scant access to the kind of 
resources that were necessary for true stabilization and reconstruction in a post-conflict 
environment. Moreover, communications were poor and their poorly maintained SUVs 
were entirely inadequate for stabilization and reconstruction operations.91 
Ultimately, the stabilization and reconstruction efforts by PRTs in Afghanistan 
were characterized by vague roles, poor communications, inadequate resources and 
tensions between civilians and the military “particularly over mission priorities.”92 
Civilians within the PRTs often complained that military personnel attached to the PRTs 
often treated them with ambivalence and regarded them as outsiders. Military personnel, 
were put off by the fact that their civilian counterparts had little if any resources and scant 
authority “vested in them by the State Department or Embassy Kabul” and on occasion 
little or no real understanding of their specific roles.93  
Complicating matters, PRT civilian members in particular were only deployed on 
a short-term basis, typically for three months at a time.94 While they cultivated close 
relationships with the Afghan communities, the interruption in the tour of duty made it 
impossible for them “understand local politics and distinguish relatively good from 
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beginning to gain some influence” their tour of duty would come to an end.96 Ultimately, 
the U.S. addressed this difficulty by extending the time to one year and other countries 
would soon follow this trend.97 
Eventually PRTs did begin to have greater impact and by 2003, they had more 
defined objectives. These objectives were to enhance security, strengthen “the reach of 
the Afghan central government” and facilitate reconstruction.98 More importantly, 
coordination between military-led PRT projects and civilian projects began to improve 
and PRTs obtained funding from the State Department Economic Support Funds to 
supplement OHDACA funds.99 
While the PRTs were accomplishing some relative success by 2005, there was 
still no satisfactory MOEs in place for calculating their success rate. McNerney notes 
that: 
The most common measure of success cited to the author by PRT 
representatives was the number of smiling Afghan children. Anecdotal 
evidence abounds of the positive impact PRTs have had on changing 
attitudes of local Afghans, as villagers went from throwing rocks at PRT 
convoys to smiling and waving as they saw the benefits of a PRT presence 
in their region.100  
Another means used for measuring success was the fact that in regions influenced by the 
Taliban, coalition forces obtained the assistance of Afghan civilians in locating 
weapons.101 And calculating the funds spent and projects completed is a simple matter, 
but not an adequate metric. As McNerney explains: 
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These projects were effective only to the extent that they improved the 
ability of the PRTs to influence local events. Influence is extremely hard 
to quantify, but is must be assessed nevertheless.102 
The MOEs used by PRTs were devoid of any semblance of a systematic metric.  
The ad hoc nature of PRTs has still not improved to an appreciable level. PRTs 
continue to function in a decentralized manner. Each Agency has failed to set clear goals 
for the overall PRTs missions and have no effective means of evaluating effectiveness or 
performance. The U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Armed Services 
reported in April of 2008 that following an investigation of PRTs in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, findings were that among the major deficits of PRTs was a lack of leadership, 
identified goals, coordination and measures of effectiveness.103  
As of 2008, the reported metrics used for measuring the success and progress of 
PRTs have been inefficient. The U.S. House of Representatives stated in its 2008 report 
that neither the DoD nor the Department of State have subscribed to an “ends, ways, and 
means” system for measuring PRTs’ progress and how they fit in with the operations’ 
strategies and objectives.104 The metrics used so far have been for the funds expended or 
the number of buildings erected.105 These metrics may provide output information, but 
they do not quantify PRT impact. Although PRT impact cannot ultimately be 
mathematically measured, MOEs can give planners a reference point for evaluating the 
value of action taken and planned actions. 
According to McNerney, the most satisfactory MOE for stabilization and 
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 The extent to which tactical-level coordination is improved 
 How well relationships are built 
 How well capacity is built106 
However, making these kinds of assessments can only be as good as the 
information obtained and shared between different agencies.107 With the poor 
communications and the tensions between civilian and military PRTs, whose primary 
function is to foster coordination between agencies, information sharing is problematic 
and MOEs will continue to lack an adequate metric system.  
It is obvious that the stabilization and reconstruction mission in Afghanistan was 
poorly planned. This is evidenced by the ad hoc measures taken only after the combat 
terminated. For instance the UN Resolution that created the ISAF came only after the 
combat terminated. It was this ad hoc preparedness that gave way to poor organizational 
structure, which in turn gave way to inadequate methods for measuring effectiveness of 
ongoing operations.  
President Barack Obama acknowledged the metrics used in Afghanistan focused 
on wrong indicators. MOEs report on the numbers of enemies killed, the number of U.S. 
deaths, and the numbers of trained Afghan police or military personnel. As stated earlier, 
these metrics can be false indicators of progress. In fact, U.S. commanders in 
Afghanistan have accepted the futility of this kind of information and are focusing 
instead on taking account of cooperation on the part of Afghan citizens and coalition 
forces.108 President Obama promises to continue assessing U.S. “efforts to train Afghan 
security forces” and the progress in combating insurgents.109 However, greater emphasis 
will be placed on measuring the development of the Afghan economy.  
 
106 McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?,” 
39. 
107 W. Flavin, “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,” Parameters (Autumn, 
2003): 95–112. 
108 D. Sanger, E. Schmitt and T. Shanker, “White House Struggles to Gauge Afghan Success,” The 
New York Times, August 7, 2009, 4A. 
109 Ibid. 
 27
                                                
The lessons learned from the lack of coordination among PRTs and with the 
military and congress can be gleaned from President Obama’s statements. Those lessons 
indicate that the U.S. has come to accept that the metrics used for gaining public support 
or justifying the deployment of troops, are insufficient for measuring progress in 
stabilization and reconstruction operations. PRTs are very important to the ability to 
measure progress in Afghanistan, quite simply because it is the “operational center of 
gravity for security, reconstruction and governance.”110 
2. Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Military operatives anticipated from the outset that there would be a period of 
instability once Saddam’s regime was overthrown111. However, the military operation 
began with a specific form of resistance in mind. Believing that Baghdad would offer the 
greatest resistance and the South would fall relatively easy, troops would begin in the 
South and “civil affairs troops and humanitarian aid organizations” would follow “once 
key cities like Basra and Nasiriyah were secured” as the troops moved forward to 
Baghdad in the North.112 However, contrary to expectations, resistance in the South was 
much stronger and Baghdad fell rapidly. The prolonged operation in the South meant that 
follow-on forces could not be deployed to Baghdad fast enough. Looting and vandalism 
immediately followed, forcing combat troops to shift “from the role of warfighters to 
peacekeepers overnight.”113 These “unexpected” contingencies complicated stabilization 
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As CSIS associate vice president Craig Cohen argues, initial analysis will be flawed 
when the “fundamental drivers of conflict and instability” are skimmed over or 
ignored.114 
Stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq was challenged from the outset. There was 
neither coordination nor method for assessing challenges faced by the reconstruction 
officials.115 The widespread devastation caused by the actual combat and the subsequent 
looting, vandalism and chaos increased the challenges for measuring the effectiveness of 
post-combat stabilization and reconstruction. As former Senior Advisor to the U.S. 
Department of State David L. Phillips explains: 
Worsening security conditions eroded America’s standing with Iraqis and 
transformed the ‘liberation’ into what U.S. officials described as 
‘occupation.’116 
There were not enough civil affairs troops to provide the critical link between 
combat and civil governance,117 therefore order could not be restored and reconstruction 
could not commence.118 Complicating matters, civil affairs officers are typically army 
reserves and as Commander Richard Powers, USN, explains: 
The frequency that they are away from their full-time civilian jobs makes 
retention difficult. Effectiveness of the future military force will 
increasingly depend on the integration of civil affairs troops into the active 
army.119 
Each of these difficulties and challenges indicate that MOE based on false 
assumptions had been relied on. As Washington Post Report Tom Ricks explained, the 
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U.S. went into Iraq with “scant international support” and “on the basis of incorrect 
information”.120 Eventually, they resorted to intermittent assessment missions rather than 
an ongoing coordination of information regarding progress and failures.121 
Satisfactory MOEs help planners identify problem areas and how to remedy those 
problems. This is particularly important in a hostile and chaotic environments. There is 
nothing to be gained from focusing on measuring violence. As General Peter Pace 
argued, you can have “zero violence” and the populace could still have a pessimistic view 
of the future.122 MOEs should reflect the Iraqi perceptions of success of the stabilization 
and reconstruction operations. This is particularly challenging when metrics are 
predisposed to measure outputs such as deaths and destruction rather than outcomes.  
An “anti-coalition insurgency” developed in Iraq and it took the U.S.-led military 
operatives a year to adjust to this new development.123 This development resulted in the 
discontinuation of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) 
and the introduction of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).  Many delays in 
stabilization and reconstruction were caused by unexpected developments. For instance, 
at a summit in Madrid in 2003, foreign donors committed $13 billion to the 
reconstruction of Iraq. But by 2007, only $3 billion in loans and grants had been 
deposited.124 Making matters worse, some coalition forces who were engaged in the 
initial combat phase began pulling out following the termination of the actual war. By 
2007, the forces of an additional 15 countries pulled out as a result of terrorist threats.125 
Each of these incidents added to the ad hoc nature of the stabilization and reconstruction 
operations. The withdrawal of donors and coalition forces could have been avoided by 
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the use of a set of MOEs with clear end goals and a focus on inter-agency and inter-
government coordination. In the absence of a sound metric for assessing progress, it is 
hardly surprising that funding and support was so tenuous. 
Critics have long maintained that the ad hoc and compartmentalized pre-war 
planning was the greatest contributing factor to the well-documented blunders in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.126 Phillips maintains that the Bush administration went into 
Iraq ill-prepared for the post-war phase and relied too strongly on Ahmad Chalabi, the 
man earmarked for replacing Saddam. The information coming from Chalabi seemed to 
be sufficient for Washington’s decisions, but ultimately proved unreliable. Chalabi 
provided intelligence of Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction and claimed 
with equal fervor that Iraqis would welcome coalition forces with flowers. The U.S. 
believed that authority would be transferred to an interim government after a brief 
transition period. Likewise, the U.S. operated on the erroneous belief that once the Ba’ath 
Party fell, “Iraq’s technocrats would transfer their loyalties to a new administration” and 
stability would be accomplished.127  
The combat operations and reconstruction planning was characterized by 
conflicting patterns that emerged at important times. At times, U.S. officials took their 
cues only from Iraqis “who told them what they wanted to hear.” But at other times, U.S. 
officials “ignored the advice of Iraqis” altogether.128 The futility of this kind of planning 
obviates the need for an effective metric system for measuring the likelihood of. In the 
absence of such a system, the U.S. miscalculated the needs in Iraq to such an extent that 
the entire stabilization and reconstruction mission can be accurately described as a 
colossal failure. 
Problems continued to emerge and the CPA made a number of tactical errors, 
which added to security problems. The CPA issued a decree dissolving the Iraqi army 
and effectively terminated their services without pay nor earned pensions. The result was 
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the transformation of 400,000 Iraqis and their extended families from potential partners 
into antagonists. The risks and benefits of issuing this decree were not accurately or 
meaningfully assessed. The CPA also failed to take into account that many of Iraq’s civil 
servants were forced into service. In fact, doctors and teachers were quite often forced to 
join the Ba’ath party in order to secure employment.129  
Other tactical errors were made by key U.S. officials. For instance, the United 
States was ambivalent rather than proactive in regards to the United Nation’s 
participation in the post-conflict resolution strategies and missions. The United States 
also failed to take into account what Iraqis truly expected. Phillips notes that after so 
many years of being subjected to a rogue and tyrant regime, Iraqis were determined to 
achieve self-governance immediately following the war. The result was that when the 
CPA appointed the Iraqi Governing Council, Iraqis rejected the appointment, viewing it 
as no more than an American puppet.130  
Ultimately, the ongoing stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq continue to 
be characterized by “endemic violence, a shattered state, a nonfunctioning economy and a 
decimated society.”131 When Major General Rick Lynch of the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry 
in Iraq was asked how success was measured, he replied: 
Measures of success are based on controlling key terrain; weapons cashes 
that you’ve taken away; key individuals that you’ve either killed or 
captured...132 
This kind of information is useful during the battle phase of the operation but does 
not provide a conceptual basis for assessing the underlying difficulties that gave rise to 
conflict in the first place. Flawed MOEs are based on taking count of captured territory, 
enemy bodies, captured enemy weapons and so forth. Plans and strategies for 
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stabilization and reconstruction cannot rely on these kinds of metrics. There is often a 
fine line between useful and useless information. Fore example, reports on the numbers 
of schools built do not measure the effectiveness of an education system. However, data 
on the number of persons actively enrolled in those schools and their retention rate 
provide better indicators.  
MOEs are that they are purely retrospective and require considerable and 
protracted analysis in order to apply them to the post-conflict environment. In a hostile 
and unpredictable environment, studying and evaluating existing trends is entirely 
impractical. Decision makers in post-combat environments where incidents are quite 
often unpredictable require a model by which to redirect or direct resources for the most 
practical and desired result.133 MOEs that focus on numbers of deaths and weapons taken 
do not provide a strategy for stabilization and reconstruction but rather a strategy based 
on “kill, capture and destroy.”134 
Relying on meaningless metrics led to a number of tactical errors. The most 
common cited errors can be summarized as follows: 
 The actual combat plan was sufficient but failed to include a comparative 
strategy for peace. 
 The number of troops deployed to stabilize Iraq in the post-combat stage were 
insufficient. 
 There was no plan in place for the prevention of looting nor was there a plan 
for effective response to it. 
 The termination of the Iraqi army was erroneous in that the Iraqi army could 
have played a pivotal role in the restoration of security. 
 Harsh decrees against Ba’ath party members only antagonized the Sunnis 
propelling many into insurgency. 
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 Isolating and disregarding the international community, particularly the UN 
and European allies contributed to the difficulties with gaining their aid with 
the stabilization and reconstruction of post-war Iraq.135 
These early mistakes have carried over into the ensuing years and have 
complicated efforts at stabilization and reconstruction. Reports of blunders continue to 
reach the public via the media. In the early aftermath of the actual war, journalist 
Krugman described for the New York Times a scenario that characterizes much of the 
post-conflict resolution difficulties. Chaos continues to expand, “attacks on convoys have 
multiplied,” main roads have been closed off and “reconstruction has slowed where it 
hasn’t stopped.”136 
Testifying before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Joseph Christoff, Director 
of International Affairs and Trade, explained that there were three key problems creating 
obstacles to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq.137 The first being the security 
challenges the U.S.-led coalition faces on a daily basis and the “continuing strength of the 
insurgency.”138 These difficulties combine to truncate virtually all efforts made for the 
transfer of security and administration to Iraqi officials and forces. Secondly, the U.S. 
lacks an adequate MOE for checking and balancing progress and performance. This not 
only makes it difficult for the U.S. to assess impact but also to effectively allocate 
appropriate resources and priorities.139 The problems is related to the inability to sustain 
reconstruction efforts as a result of security problems and difficulties with continuous 
access to water and electricity.140 
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The U.S. government realizes that decision-making in stabilization and 
reconstruction operations in Iraq has been burdened by unsatisfactory MOEs. In this 
regard the government has recently turned its attention to gathering more meaningful 
information from field operators. This information includes economic and infrastructure 
improvements.141 However, this information does not assess whether or not Iraqis are 
contented and have an optimistic outlook for the future. Likewise, the U.S. government’s 
commitment to documenting the numbers of trained Iraqi security forces does not in any 
way indicate if the root problems of the conflict have been eradicated. These indicators 
are merely reflective of inputs and outputs and not actual outcomes. As former Pentagon 
and State Department intelligence analyst Anthony Cordesman pointed out, even with the 
new approach to MOEs in Iraq, the information provided by the U.S. Army and USAID 
focuses primarily on details about the allocation of funds and very little on 
accountability.142 
Unsatisfactory MOEs are at the core of the continuing security problems and lack 
of successful stability and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Adequate MOEs could have 
anticipated and planned for effective security measures and helped avoid the re-allocation 
of reconstruction resources to cover security costs. MOEs that simply report on outputs 
and inputs rather than outcomes will not resolve the problems that are delaying 
stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.  
E. CURRENT STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGIES 
The approach taken to military operations and post-conflict missions following 
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strategies for an “overwhelming preponderance in favor of the ‘small footprint’ or ‘low 
profile’ force posture.”143 This new post September 11 approach to stabilization and 
reconstruction can be summarized as follows: 
 Allied forces in post-combat Afghanistan represent one-fortieth the troops to 
population ratio that NATO deployed in Bosnia. 
 The United States deployed approximately three times more troops to Iraq 
than NATO deployed to Kosovo four years earlier. However, the troop to 
population ratio in Iraq was at least one-third the ratio of that in Kosovo.  
 In 2004, the U.S. troops deployed in Haiti were only one-tenth of the size 
deployed to Haiti some ten years earlier.144 
In each of these cases, the low profile or small footprint U.S.-led forces proved 
unsuccessful and in each case additional troops were added. In both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the United States was forced to increase force presence.145 In Haiti, the 
2004 U.S.-led troops were supplemented by additional U.N.-led troops.146 Essentially, 
the smaller forces were not able to obtain security.  
The U.S. history of construction and rehabilitation in military operations has 
provided a hard learned lesson. This lesson is unambiguously stated in the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 of 28 November, 2005. The relevant 
part of Directive 3000.05 reads as follows: 
Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission…They shall be given 
priority comparable to combat operations…and incorporated into all 
phases of planning.147 
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It appears from the comments of the new International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) Commander, General Stanley McChrystal, that message is now being applied. 
McChrystal said that the MOEs will no longer be marked by enemies killed, but by “the 
number of Afghans shielded from violence.”148  
OEF and OIF illustrate how long and complicated stabilization and reconstruction 
operations can be.149 In both cases, U.S.-led forces saw rapid and decisive victories in the 
combat phase. However, the post-combat environment stabilization and reconstruction 
efforts continue. The post-conflict phase largely depends on satisfactory MOEs, but in a 
recent report to Congress, the focus of MOEs continues to depend on security issues150 
rather than the underlying factors that influence long-term stability, such as 
infrastructure, economy, rule of law and population perspectives. A closer examination of 
these two military stabilization and reconstruction efforts can help us understand how 
these efforts can be improved upon for optimum results by employing a more satisfactory 
MOE. 
Each of these operations remain in place for the purpose of stabilization and 
reconstruction within the ambit of peace building aspirations. More importantly perhaps, 
each of these military operations are a manifestation of the fact that success requires that 
the first phase of military operations involve planning well in advance of initiating the 
process. Similarly, advance planning is also required for the “subsequent phase of 
conflict.”151 Ultimately, the success of each phase requires a satisfactory method for 
measuring progress and not merely assessing inputs and outputs such as these. 
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III. CHAPTER III 
A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS OVERVIEW 
Military commanders and politicians alike increasingly emphasize the 
significance of MOEs. The military utilizes MOEs to analyze and justify courses of 
action to political leaders, higher headquarters, and the public. Administratively, the 
military uses Unit Reports (USR), Operational Readiness (OR) statistics and other 
administrative assessments to evaluate the military’s operational/combat readiness.152 
Beyond administrative and public accountability, the military is also required to measure 
the effectiveness of combat operations. 
For operational purposes, MOEs provide a basis for commanders to make 
decisions in a timely manner. The key is to develop a metric that informs strategy. 
Metrics are typically useful for making course corrections, rather than anticipating 
trends.153 The accuracy of these metrics may determine whether an operation will fail, 
succeed or otherwise drag on.154 Inaccurate MOEs man result in poor decisions that 
ultimately lead to a chain reaction of “negative effects that will not bring the organization 
closer to reaching its objectives.”155 Moreover, following through on inaccurate and ill 
constructed MOEs can waste time and resources.156  
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Rumsfeld noted that in the new age of terrorism and insurgencies, the United 
States had an increasing need to “reorient” its “military capabilities to contend with such 
irregular challenges more effectively.”157 It is therefore essential that the military acquire 
an improved method for calculating MOEs and better integrate them into operational 
missions. U.S. Army Major Douglas Jones notes that: 
As the United States addresses the admittedly growing problem of 
worldwide insurgencies, an effective way to husband valuable resources 
and military efforts is to develop effective metrics that would enable 
military commanders and policy makers to evaluate analytically if the 
execution of their strategy was successfully defeating the insurgents.158 
Jones obviously favors an approach to metrics that assumes that insurgency alone 
created the conflict and will impact goals in SSTR.  However, Craig Cohen vice president 
for research and programs at the Center for International and Strategic Studies in 
Washington, D.C., argues for a metrics system that would measure progress of SSTR 
missions by assessing the success of a strategy that not only minimizes the means, but 
also the incentive for conflict. MOEs would also evaluate and assess both institutional 
and local abilities to keep the peace. In other words progress should be measured by 
outcome, rather than on “the number of products and services delivered or the amount of 
resources consumed.”159  
Insurgencies are a well-known source of security problems in Iraq and a major 
obstacle to accomplishing SSTR operations in that country. To this end, MOEs have 
become so central to the efforts in Iraq that the U.S. Congress has mandated DoD is to 
provide a quarterly report entitled Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, which 
includes “specific performance indicators and measures of progress toward political, 
economic, and security stability in Iraq.”160 While this report may provide a useful tool 
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for Congress, it is far less so in helping commanders to make decisions on the ground. 
Another difficulty is that MOEs used by Congress provide a broad-based approach that is 
open to a variety of interpretations.161 DoD describes MOEs as “tools used to measure 
results achieved in the overall mission and execution of assigned tasks, “162 which is fine 
as far as it documents (no paragraph) completed tasks and missions. In testimony to the 
U.S. Senate, Joseph A. Christoff, Director of International Affairs and Trade, argued that 
a report based on a number of completed missions in Iraq do not accurately reflect 
progress toward mission goals. For instance, a number of reports documented the 
completion of water supplies stations and sanitation services, but failed to indicate how 
many Iraqis, as a result of these projects, have access to clean water.163  
Another example of a flawed metric is provided by the U.S. State Department, 
which tracks completed health facilities as indicators of access by Iraqis to health care, 
without taking into consideration the nature of medical equipment, staff quantity, or any 
measure of quality of care. Attention to these and other details–such as cost, or access if a 
clinic is located in a Sunni or Shi’a neighborhood, would provide a more accurate 
indication of the effectiveness of reconstruction missions and how they impact Iraqis.164 
B. RAND CORPORATION MOE 
In 2001, the Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, together with the Office of the 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and the Department of the Army Staff, 
commissioned the RAND Corporation to leverage information technology to collect a 
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The mandate noted, “Chief among the analytical tools required are good measures of 
effectiveness that can demonstrate the value of information in terms of military 
outcomes.”165 
Jones maintains, however, that, the 2001 RAND report was not altogether 
successful in persuading the Army of the utility of MOEs,166 primarily because RAND 
used the DoD’s definition of MOEs as a reference point and as a result overemphasized 
assigned tasks (inputs?) over mission results (outputs). For instance, calculating tonnage 
of logistics and timeliness of support does not shed light on whether or not a particular 
insurgency is weakening. This method of measuring progress in terms of outputs is more 
suitable to a conventional war in which production equals results, rather than an 
asymmetric conflict.167 Body counts, troop “surges,” munitions expended, enemies 
targeted and so on are poor indicators of “progress.” MOEs should not only tell what is 
being done and what has been done, but also how the completed and ongoing tasks are 
accomplishing the stated end goal.168 
Additionally, the 2001 RAND report used calculus and equations to measure data, 
a method difficult to imagine commanders applying in the field. As a result, the RAND 
approach simply inundated field commanders with information that they are incapable of 
interpreting.169 As Jones explains: 
Measures of effectiveness that reveal the quality of assigned tasks and 
require an extensive math background to understand are not useful in 
discerning to an operational commander if his military actions are being 
conducted along logical lines of operations…170 
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Capitalizing on this concept, MOEs for military operations should consist of the 
following attributes: 
 Be meaningful and closely connected to the ascribed end state goals 
 Link causes and consequences 
 Be observable 
 Be quantifiable  
 Be specific 
Applying these suggested characteristics to a hypothetical situation in which a 
commanding officer has identified the improvement of the critical infrastructure in his 
area of operations as a goal, he would conclude that electricity production is a critical 
MOE. The commander will carefully take account of a MOE for assessing and/or 
predicting how successful his mission will be and will avoid “the simple megawatts of 
electricity produced and adroitly chooses average hours of available power.”171 
The unanswered question in this MOE is: how is the quantification of megawatts 
of electricity benefiting Iraqis so that stabilization and reconstruction missions are 
meeting the end state goal? NATO may have finally found the formula for measuring 
progress relative to completed infrastructure. In December 2007, NATO reported that it 
had devised at least 63 indicators for measuring progress in Afghanistan. These indicators 
focus on analyzing the effect that completed missions produced. For example, NATO’s 
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe said that it is not enough to know that a road was 
constructed. NATO would endeavor to find out if Afghan farmers had meaningful access 
to those roads so that they could market crops, earn more and thereby become less likely 
to fall prey to insurgent recruitment. Account would also be taken of whether or not 
insurgents were preventing locals’ use of newly constructed roads.172 
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In this regard, the commander is not concerned with the meaningless data with 
respect to the megawatts of electricity or the number of roads constructed. He focuses 
instead on the how often electricity is available and how he can manage his time and 
resources to further support availability. Likewise, the information about the number of 
roads constructed and use by Afghans tells the commander whether or not Afghans are 
utilizing the new roads effectively, so that a decision regarding road blocks or security 
checks can be taken. In this regard, the MOE is only meaningful if it is linked to strategic 
end state, has links cause and effect, and is observable, quantifiable and precise. 
The MOE is meaningful because it provides a metric that permits a decision for 
time management, space and asset purposes in the commander’s operational framework. 
As Jones explains: 
By measuring, the average hours of available power the commander can 
assess the effectiveness of this line of operation within his region. If there 
is a sudden shift in either, the average hours or the available power the 
commander has an effective tool to realize there will be a change in the 
environment. The information allows the commander to consider the 
consequences of the environmental changes and adjust his friendly forces 
and resources accordingly.173 
Counterinsurgency operations require knowledge about the state’s historical 
narrative: its culture, habits, governance, society, insurgency, psychology and religion. 
Failure to come to terms with these aspects of a state will render insurmountable 
consequences. In terms of the number or hours that electricity is provided to the 
populace, there is a definite link between cause and effect. For instance, commanders in 
active duty in Iraq concluded that there was a definite link between electrical supplies and 
other aspects of critical infrastructure with job decline and insurgency activities.174 
The available hours of electrical power is an observable MOE. Likewise, the 
number of Afghans gaining effective access to constructed roads is an observable MOE. 
In other words, this characteristic of a MOE is a “distinct” feature. However, if a MOE is 
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not capable of observation it becomes useless information. For example, the methods 
used by insurgents are not capable of “complete” observation. The practice of planting 
bombs, blending in with the general population and the use of “hit and run” tactics makes 
it difficult to observe. Insurgents also compromise detection and observation by 
exploiting the anonymity and complexity of urban regions.175 In general, insurgencies 
are characterized by ambush and harassment, but for the most part, attacks are executed 
by surprise and covert action.176 In this regard, many aspects of insurgencies are 
unobservable and incapable of precise measurement. 
Precision is just as important for making decisions. The fact that the available 
hours of electricity can be calculated, allows the commander to gain precise information, 
and avoids making decisions based on false or misleading data. Acting on imprecise 
information can result in mismanagement of forces, resources, time, space and goals. As 
Major Mark Brock explains, commanders and those under his or her command have time 
constraints with respect to making decisions and carrying out their respective tasks.177 
Perhaps more importantly, the MOE must be the subject of constant review because as 
the environment changes, adjustments must be made to correspond with those 
changes.178 This is particularly important in counter-insurgency operations that create a 
particularly turbulent and violent environment. Reliance on inaccurate information for 
decision-making in hostile environment is akin to gambling.179 MOEs will necessarily 
have to be modified to accommodate those constant changes. For example, in the 
hypothetical electricity scenario, it is conceivable that with economic improvements more 
members of the general population would purchase and use more electrical appliances 
with the result that more electricity will be required. 
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For any MOE to be useful some party or parties are selected to gather and 
evaluate data. In the absence of delegated observers, modes and places of observation, 
MOEs are no more than ad hoc exercises delinked from strategic goals. 
C. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE MOES 
The Brookings Institute’s Afghanistan Index June 2, 2009, provides a wealth of 
information that can be used to measure the success of stabilization and reconstruction 
operations in Afghanistan from 2001-2009. While this index may be helpful for the 
ongoing operations, it is far too comprehensive for field operators faced with spur of the 
moment decisions in a hostile environment. The information compiled originates from 
U.S. Government, foreign journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), but only a 
small amount originates from Afghan sources.180  
This information requires compilation over time and is specific to Afghanistan. It 
requires taking data from the start of operations and comparing it with new information to 
detect trends. For instance, between 2007 and 2009 Afghan civilian deaths rose from 50 
for the month of January 2007, to 253 by June 2007. By January 2008, they had dropped 
to 56 per months. However there was a sharp increase in February 2008 to 168 with 
slight declines in the next three months. In June 2008 those numbers again rose sharply 
from 172 deaths in May to 323. In June the numbers went up to 341, dropped again in 
August to 162, rose in September to 194 and began a steady decline so that by April 2009 
the number of civilian Afghan deaths was 77.181 Based on this information, it is 
reasonable to conclude that security operations are not bringing about the stability.  
In 2008, 13 percent of the Afghan civilian deaths were attributed to anti-
government entities (AGE), 34 percent were attributed to suicide and IED attacks by 
AGE, 26 percent to pro-government air strikes and 2 percent to pro-government forces. 
Twenty-five percent were designated “other incidents.”182 The numbers of U.S. troops 
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wounded or killed in Afghan have also shown a marked increase in 2009. This 
information demonstrates that security operations are largely unsuccessful. There has 
been a marked increase in the number of troops in the Afghan National Army from 
10,000 in 2003 to 90,000 by 2009. However, the “capability milestone” demonstrates 
that, while some of these troops are battle trained, the majority require assistance from 
international forces.183 Similarly, the Afghan police are not yet capable of “conducting 
primary operational missions.”184 
In terms of economic effectiveness, the Afghan index demonstrates that opium 
production has spiked since the war in Afghanistan began. Annual inflation also dropped 
from 2003 to 2009. However, opinion polls indicate that Afghans are losing confidence 
in the ongoing stabilization and reconstruction efforts: while 77 percent of the 
respondents felt that things were going in the right direction in 2005, by 2009 only 40 
percent thought so. In 2005, 68 percent of Afghans rated the U.S. performance as either 
good or excellent. However, by 2009 that number declined to only 32 percent.185 
According to Frederick Barton, Co-Director of the Post Conflict Reconstruction 
Project Centre for Strategic and International Studies, opinion polls can be valuable 
assessment tools.186 They can influence change and direction in ongoing reconstruction 
operations.187 For the most part, apprehension about the Taliban increased over the years 
and support for the current government remains relatively high. Likewise, a large 
majority of respondents felt the Taliban posed the greatest danger to Afghanistan. 
Afghans participating in the polls were also satisfied that the main reasons things were 
going in the right direction was because of the rebuilding, opening schools for females, 
and increased security. For those who thought things were going in the wrong direction, 
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the primary reasons cited were insecurity and poor economic conditions. Perhaps more 
telling, respondents agreed that their families were more prosperous than they had been 
during Taliban rule.188 
The information compiled in the Afghanistan Index does measure the success and 
shortcomings of the stabilization and reconstruction operations. However, the metric 
relies too heavily on comparing and evaluating trends from one year to the next, which 
keeps coalition strategists in a reactive mode. The Brookings Institute Iraq Index 
calculates the complex variables that must be taken into account. But it can be far too 
complex for a dynamic environment. The Iraq Index also leaves one with the impression 
that the complex problems the U.S.-led coalition encountered in post-conflict Iraq might 
have been avoided with better planning based on more accurate MOEs.  
Iraqi civilian deaths since 2003 show a marked monthly increase in the mid years 
peaking at 3,500 deaths in January 2007, followed by a slow decline to 350 deaths by 
April 2009.189 The incidents of enemy attacks on coalition forces also peaked in 2007, 
with rapid decline thereafter. Shiite suicide bombings were the most prevalent in March 
2007 with fluctuations throughout the ensuing years. In April 2009, there was a marked 
increase in Shiite suicide bombings over the previous months, but a rapid decline by May 
2009.190 
The number of U.S. troop fatalities since the start of the war also shows an 
increase in the middle years over and above those in the initial and latter stages. 
Interestingly, the number of foreigners crossing over into Iraq for the specific purpose of 
supporting the insurgency have declined from between 80 and 90 monthly in early 2007 
to just 20 a month in May 2009.191  
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Capability measurements indicate that a majority of Iraq’s security force is 
currently prepared to plan, execute, and sustain counterinsurgency operations only with 
coalition support. Economically, oil exports from Iraq have increased from zero in 2003 
to $28 billion in 2008, before declining to $11.5 billion in 2009. Unemployment shows 
no appreciable changes from 2003 to 2009 with the rates in June 2003 showing 50-60 
percent unemployment variable and fluctuating to between 40-50 percent and 25-40 
percent to December 2008. In January 2009, there was a slight improvement of 23-38 
percent unemployment.192  
Opinion polls indicate that 52 percent of participants believe that, as of 2009, 
security has improved in Iraq, compared to just 8 percent in 2007. Confidence in the Iraqi 
military has also increased over the years, as has confidence in the Iraqi police, the Iraqi 
government and the U.S. military. Approval ratings for the current Iraqi Prime Minister 
vary. The Shi’a approval ratings for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki improved from 67 
percent in March 2007, declined slightly in August 2007, and improved to 70 percent in 
2009. The Kurds, however, started with a 60 percent approval rating before it dropped to 
51 percent in 2009. The Sunni’s approval rating has always been low, but improved from 
3 percent in 2007 to 31 percent in 2009.193 
According to the opinion poll, security has always been the greatest cause for 
concern for Iraqis, with politics and the military a close second. Interestingly, concerns 
about the economy have increased over the years, as have social concerns. While 
respondents felt that access to fuel improved over the years, there is a general consensus 




192 O’Hanlon and Campbell, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-
Saddam Iraq,” 40. 
193 Ibid., 50. 
194 Ibid., 51. 
 48
                                                
Again, the problem with these measures of effectiveness is that they are purely 
retrospective and require considered and protracted analysis in order to apply them to the 
post-conflict environment. Decision makers in post-combat environments where 
incidents are quite often unpredictable require a model for MOEs that will allow them to 
redirect resources to achieve strategic results.195  
D. MPICE 
Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) is a metrics framework 
that attempts to assess conflict transformation and stabilization. MPICE acknowledges 
the weakness of the U.S. government’s approach to MOEs: that they only reveal what has 
been done rather than what has been achieved. 
Outcomes reflect success or failure rates as they occur in the course of a 
mission.196 An outcome attempts to discern the conditions that either cultivate or curtail 
stability and reconstruction. DoD, the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the Department of State have been cooperating 
with other partners such as academics and NGOs to develop an improved strategy for 
stabilization and reconstruction operations. MPICE has created a framework of indicators 
that are designed to measure outcomes in the realms of governance, economics, security, 
rule of law and social well being over time.197  
Using these five indicators as a measuring base makes it possible to monitor those 
factors that fuel conflict as well as measure the success of reconstruction. MPICE takes 
the position that conflict stabilization and societal reconstruction occur at far ends of the 
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middle. The MPICE indicators are calculated to provide actors with an instrument for 
gaining insight with respect to the conflict in the environment and to monitor success and 
failure rates by reference to this spectrum.198 
MPICE focuses on what is called “cooperative security.” 199 The approach taken 
to measuring progress is multifaceted and relies on a system of research and development 
for measuring the progress in stabilization operations. MPICE is also outcome oriented in 
that progress is collated to goals in the context of the five sectors previously noted. In 
measuring these outcomes, MPICE relies on perceptions as well as quantitative data. 
Progress is also measured by reference to the balance between “drivers of conflict” and 
“institutional performance.”200  
MPICE focuses on three stages of conflict transformation: 
 Imposed stability (where intervention is active and necessary). 
 Assisted stability (where outside military and other sources of intervention is 
diminished.) 
 Self-sustaining peace (when the state can function independently). 
Ultimately, MPICE measures transformation, essentially a new concept.201 
Measuring transformation can be very useful in terms of monitoring objectives and 
determining where the operation is in terms of achieving those goals. However, 
transformation does not actually take into account changing environments and as such 
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Overall, MPICE MOEs are predicated on the theory that evaluating a specific 
state at the time of intervention to ascertain whether there are conditions favorable to 
conflict. It goes on to measure the state’s capacity peacefully to resolve conflict. In other 
words, MPICE creates an instrument for measuring conflict transformation. 
The MPICE MOE consists of a series of questions calculated to determine 
progress. For instance, does a particular location have electricity or sanitation? These 
kinds of questions cannot illicit accurate information because they can only be answered 
by crossing off a “yes” or “no.” In circumstances where there is no electricity, the army 
might provide power generators. It therefore follows that there either “yes” or “no” can 
accurately respond to the question. Moreover, it is unclear whether or not the absence or 
presence of electricity is a security risk since lack of power might either impede or 
encourage insurgency activity. Much depends on the culture and/or habits of the 
insurgents. 
MPICE’s MOE for political moderation and stable democracy sets forth a two-
staged objective. (See Figure 1) Stage one requires international assistance to respond to 
“competition for power and political grievances that” generate violence and channeling 
those conditions into peaceful “processes and participatory institutions. Stage II has as its 
objective getting “political institutions and participatory processes” to “function 
legitimately and effectively” in the absence of international assistance. Encapsulated 
within these objectives are two goals: diminish the “drivers of conflict” and strengthen 
“institutional performance.”202 
Both objectives and their goals provide a sound basis for creating a link between 
decreasing violence and increased governmental effectiveness. It also provides a base 
measure for determining how capable state institutions are to prevent a return to violence. 
However, these objectives are based on assumptions of democratic governments and 
cannot be effectively applied in countries with more autocratic, tribal, or religious-based 
notions of legitimacy. In these conditions, objectives would have to be framed on a case- 
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by-case basis. In other words, governmental structures reflect value systems and these 
value systems will vary from one country to another. It is also erroneous to assume that 
all violence is politically motivated. 
 
Figure 1.   Political Moderation and Stable Democracy.203 
MPICE sets frameworks for measuring fiscal strength, democratization, drivers of 
conflict (see Figure 2) among many others. While these frameworks are comprehensive, 
they lack specificity and can illicit imprecise information. For instance, the framework 
for drivers of conflict counts new combatants. But it may be virtually impossible to take a 
census of combatants, old or new, as neither is likely capable of identification unless 
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captured. It would seem that in the face of these non-specific questions, quantification is 
virtually impossible. Again it comes down to imprecise information, the consequences of 
which can lead to erroneous decisions in an environment that is essentially in a constant 
state of change.204 It therefore renders that kind of information almost entirely useless for 
the purpose of a satisfactory MOE. 
 
Figure 2.   Drivers of Conflict.205 
The primary problem with the MPICE approach is that it is best suited to times of 
peace. The data it requires is difficult to measure in a conflict environment. It therefore 
lacks specificity and makes blanket assumptions about the causes of violence. For this 
reason a SSTR strategy based on the MPICE analytical method is likely to be flawed. 
MPICE presupposes that inter-operational techniques and communications for 
information sharing can be coordinated by field operators. However, the Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy reported in 2007 that, despite improvements, 
field commanders continued to experience problems with coordination and cooperation 
between military factions, and between the military and the government agencies. 
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Moreover, the most frequent means of communication was by cellular phones through 
liaison officers who lacked translators, or at least translators who were comfortable with 
working for the military206 
Therefore, information is both difficult to collect and coordinate in SSTR 
operations. Much information must be collected from the host country, which requires 
communication in a foreign language. Lack of translators can compromise field 
operations. The MPICE framework is not going to provide much of an aid unless the 
process is conducted in advance of the conflict. Once undertaken, field operations make it 
virtually impossible recruit personnel able to follow through with the MPICE framework. 
At best, imprecise information is useless for measuring progress, and may lead to 
uninformed decisions in the field.  
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IV. CHAPTER IV 
A. CONCLUSION 
Accurately assessing progress in conflict environments is among the most critical 
challenges the United States Government (USG) faces in Stability, Security, Transition 
and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations today.  While the USG can accurately track 
military progress in battle operations, it lacks sufficient tools to track short- and long-
term social, economic, and political progress throughout the course of stabilization and 
reconstruction operations.   
A number of MOE frameworks have been developed in recent years, including 
MPICE, RAND and the Brookings Institute’s Afghanistan and Iraq frameworks that are 
discussed in Chapter Three.  These tools have been developed to provide planners and 
analysts with the ability to apply metrics to tasks developed in support of complex 
contingency operations.  Unfortunately, these tools are often too complex or impractical 
to implement in a conflict environment.  In some cases, the metrics are too specific or 
require data that is virtually impossible to collect in non-permissive environments. Still 
others fail to take account of the interaction of factors and their impact.  These MOEs are 
too imprecise to allow an operational commander to know if his actions are having the 
desired impact. 
What is required for the post-conflict environment is a set of relatively simple, 
robust MOEs that can be adapted to different situations.  Given the complex environment 
of SSTR operations, this might not always be possible.  Nevertheless, this thesis has 
argued that current MOE frameworks can be improved.  In particular, commanders 
should pay more attention to results (outcomes) rather than merely looking at inputs and 
outputs.  For instance, if a specific goal is to improve access to local health facilities, 
measuring the numbers of clinics completed will not reveal whether or not access to local 
health facilities has improved.  In order effectively to measure, progress it will be 
necessary to determine whether or not the completed clinics are properly equipped and 
staffed and whether locals have access to these facilities.  
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Current measurement systems tend to focus too greatly on quantitative indicators 
of limited utility.  They also fail to appreciate the quality, rationale, and appropriateness 
of the initial inputs in relation to the environment.  Too often, performance indicators and 
milestones are not clearly defined, and few benchmarks are created to evaluate progress.  
Bottom line, current performance measures capture inputs and outputs, but fail to capture 
outcomes. 
Even the best MOEs that monitor and quantify progress too often fail to take 
sufficient account of the diverse political and societal cultures.  Part of the problem lies in 
the fact that missions often utilize quantitative output measures as their objectives.  For 
instance, establishing internal security through the development of local police services is 
a key outcome in Afghanistan and Iraq.  However, organizations that measure internal 
security by the number of police officers trained and the number of uniforms and 
equipment issued often fail to consider the quality of the training, improvements in 
security, or the effectiveness of the new police in controlling crime and violence.207  This 
is because quantitative measures are visible, easy to measure and monitor, and thus can 
be pointed to by government officials, NGOs, or contractors as examples of progress.  
Outcomes are notoriously hard to measure in the short-run when the requirement to show 
success to maintain the support for the mission may be most critical. 
But even faulty MOEs that buy time in the short run may prove costly over time 
because they can lead a commander or policy maker to make inappropriate and costly 
decisions based on a faulty net assessment.  For example, merely counting the miles of 
roads constructed in Afghanistan without knowing if the locals have meaningful access to 
those roads can lead to a conclusion that progress is being made.  When in reality, locals 
may not be using those roads at all because the insurgency makes them too dangerous or 
police shakedowns make them too expensive.  Therefore, measuring miles of asphalt 
without dealing with underlying problems of insecurity or corruption as not a meaningful 
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MOE. Organizations often fall short of mission objectives and waste time and money 
when pursuing analysis and collection based on poorly developed measures of 
effectiveness.   
By taking time to understand the post-conflict environment, it may be possible to 
develop metrics that can measure the effectiveness within each pillar of reconstruction.  
Accurate MOEs would allow commanders to assess effectiveness and make well-
informed strategic and resource adjustments   By using MOEs as a tool that links the 
logical lines of operations to the operational objectives, and eventually the strategic end 
state, while taking into account the political and cultural dimensions of the conflict 
environment, commanders can develop the measurement techniques necessary to 
evaluate the progress of counterinsurgency operations.  It is possible to link measures of 
effectiveness to logical lines of operations because many of an insurgency’s 
characteristics can be assessed, defined, and quantified.  However, measuring data in 
SSTR operations can be difficult.  For instance, it is possible to monitor the degree to 
which locals move freely and the frequency and degree to which they conduct their daily 
lives.  This idea can be accounted for by looking at the number of locals that attend newly 
constructed schools and use newly constructed roads.  One can also measure market 
prices to assess, for instance, insecurity or corruption impacts the economy. These 
measures will be a good indicator of whether an insurgency continues to impede progress 
in stabilization and reconstruction efforts.   
Likewise success of the security pillar in SSTR operations cannot be measured by 
looking at the number of insurgents captured or killed.  Unlike conventional operations, 
tactical and operational victories alone do not equal success against insurgents because 
psychological, political, and strategic factors also play a key role.  This concept was 
illustrated by the United States in Vietnam and by Israel against Hezbollah in Lebanon.  
In both cases, the conventional armies won nearly every “battle” but failed to achieve 
their strategic objectives because the enemy simply went to ground, blended into the 
population, and lived to fight another day. 
Effective metrics must be developed to the characteristics of adequate measures 
of effectiveness.  They must be: meaningful, linked to the strategic end state, observable, 
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quantifiable, precise, and have a strong identifiable relationship between cause and effect.  
Planners must not stop there—they must also determine who will observe data, when, 
how, and where to observe the data.  Like any reconnaissance mission, planners must 
allocate the required force structure and resources to ensure the information required to 
obtain MOE data is properly staffed.  These challenges must be considered when MOEs 
are developed to ensure the commander can synchronize his operational framework. 
Counterinsurgency and SSTR operations are likely to continue as primary 
contingencies for U.S. forces for years to come.  The National Security Strategy and 
corresponding military doctrine are adapting to meet this threat.  Although insurgency is 
a complex phenomenon shaped by geography and culture, it does contain common 
characteristics that allow a military to apply lessons learned from one insurgency to 
another.  These common characteristics make it possible to design metrics that can 
evaluate the success of an operational framework and enable a commander to make an 
informed decision about resources allocation, force structure and strategic adjustments to 
enhance SSTR outcomes. 
The difficulty with devising a MOE for SSTR operations is due to the fact that 
each operation faces unique.  The author takes the position that it is not possible to devise 
a MOE that can be applied “across the board”.  What is required is a standard guideline 
for constructing an adequate set of MOEs which is designed to collect information and 
data that is relevant to the specific SSTR environment and local political, social and 
economic conditions.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The aim of this research was to expose and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses 
of MOEs in stabilization and reconstruction environments.  This thesis set out to examine 
how MOEs can be utilized to form a more comprehensive assessment tool by taking into 
account the differences in the political and cultural environment of states in which SSTR 
is applied.  By exposing inadequacies, and taking the strengths of each of these MOEs, I 
hoped to design a comprehensive set of MOEs for commanders that was field-friendly, 
yet robust.  Unfortunately research findings indicate that the best approach to MOEs is to 
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measure only that which is quantifiable and observable, and what is quantifiable and 
observable will not be known until a specific target is identified.  For example, history 
dictates that the post-conflict environment in Iraq is quite different from the post-conflict 
environment in Europe and Japan following World War II.  The economic, political, 
cultural and social conditions were vastly different and what might indicate success in 
one environment may not indicate success in the other.  The author has therefore come to 
the conclusion that rather than devise a comprehensive MOE that can be used in SSTR 
operations, it would be more practical to devise a guideline that is amenable to 
constructing MOEs for the divergent environments that inevitably confront SSTR 
operations.   
 Current MOEs such as those devised by the Brookings Institute, RAND and 
MPICE seek to improve on past approaches to MOEs but tend to focus too strongly on 
comprehensive information that is impractical to evaluate in post-conflict environments. 
As stated, some of these MOEs may solicit information that is not relevant to all post-
conflict environments.  In other instances, the information solicited in surveys, such as 
the number of newly recruited combatants, is so abstract that they render responses 
unreliable.   
I concluded that MOEs should be results-based management instruments that help 
commanders determine how and to what degree desired outcomes are being met; 
therefore, they require both a target and a baseline.  These MOEs should be entirely 
objective, capable of quantification and should be earmarked within a certain time frame.  
Results-based MOEs would also focus on progress with respect to meeting goals rather 
than assessing the completion of specific tasks.  The key is to assess progress made by 
reference to observable and quantifiable results in relation to strategies and field missions 
that are designed to meet end goals.  MOEs must use indicators of progress that can be 
measured objectively and preferably by independent parties. 
I was unable to produce a set of MOEs that fully encapsulated the necessary 
factors, as each post-conflict environment will have its own unique goals and its own set 
of factors requiring different concepts of progress.  However, below are 
recommendations for developing MOEs for a specific situation. 
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The development of an appropriate MOE should begin by taking a pre-conflict 
baseline survey of the political and cultural/social nature of the targeted state rather than 
on the intervening state’s own policies and strategies.  Efforts should also be made to 
determine what the population wants and to ensure that those aspirations are consistent 
with operational goals.  If the interveners and the populace are in agreement in their 
objectives, the chances of a return to conflict are minimized and security will not become 
an insurmountable problem.  In this regard, less time spent measuring security provides 
more time and resources allocated to reconstruction. 
Analyzing the current conditions will aid in setting realistic goals and by doing so, 
will set a guideline for what ought to be measured. Then it must be determined what 
political, economic and social factors contributed to the conflict and instability.  This 
must be balanced against local capacities effectively to respond to these factors.  Once 
these factors are analyzed, efforts should be made to determine what steps can be taken to 
close the gap between what is required and the capabilities of the local population.  The 
emphasis with respect to measuring success should therefore be on assessing the state’s 
long-term ability to achieve and sustain progress in these core areas.  
Ultimately, a MOE in a conflict environment is intended to gauge the 
effectiveness of operations in the context of objectives and goals.  If those goals and 
objectives are clearly defined at the outset, there is at least a yardstick for measuring 
progress.  The MOE seeks to provide a basis for knowing what results are desired, how 
those results are being accomplished, whether or not there are obstacles to accomplishing 
those goals, and how those obstacles can be removed or minimalized at the very least.  
The goals of the operation should be divided among core results that define its success.  
Invariably, these results should be the four pillars of reconstruction: security, governance, 
rule of law, and economic and social welfare.  For example, to help assess progress in the 
security pillar, one proposal would be to measure freedom of movement by monitoring 
the number of roadblocks and checkpoints.  Another useful assessment would be taking 
account of the number of people who feel safe or threatened travelling to work, school, or 
to the markets.  Each of these assessments are useful indicators of whether or not 
progress is being made and to what degree.  Similarly, progress in terms of social and 
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economic welfare can be assessed by school attendance and graduation rates, 
employment, access to health care, election participation, justice and the protection of 
basic human rights.  Each of these measures of progress is tied to the strategies and goals 
of the stabilization and reconstruction mission.  
The author plans to use these recommendations during his upcoming deployment 
to Afghanistan to develop further a set of MOEs that is robust yet field-friendly.  The 
author does believe that it will be possible to develop a “core set” of MOEs that will 
allow commanders a starting point to work from.  This “core set” of MOEs is envisioned 
to be no more than 4-5 indicators for each of the four pillars of reconstruction.  These 
twenty or so indicators would give a commander a “down and dirty” assessment and 
provide the backbone to develop a more comprehensive set of MOEs specifically tailored 
for the operation.  
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